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permissible defense, and such an interpretation of the Code was probably
unintended since an even stricter standard is normally required of at-
torneys than of others. The rule should be more explicit in its use of the
word "knowingly."
Why did the justices in Nadler believe that the attorney's conduct
was unethical? Mrs. Treptow was not harmed; she was financially un-
able to complete her purchase of the property in any event.' The answer
is that such conduct causes injury to the integrity of the legal profession
and judicial system. The essence of the fiduciary relationship is the trust
and confidence a client places in his attorney. Such trust must be pro-
tected by the law, or the effectiveness of the judicial system declines.
Given his unique access to information regarding a client's property, an
attorney should not be allowed to use such information to his own advan-
tage-if for no other reasons than basic notions of fairness and equity.
If, as occurred in Nadler, the lawyer becomes his client's creditor, he can
hardly be expected to conduct the client's affairs with the objective zeal
demanded of the advocate-the lawyer's own pecuniary interests become
bound with those of his client.
In summary, the American Bar Association recently has clarified and
strengthened the fiduciary duties of the attorney wishing to deal in his
client's property. Unfortunately; the revision of the ABA Canons prob-
ably would not aid a court in dealing effectively with the situation before
the Iowa court in Nadler. The concept of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by an attorney to his client, however, should be used by courts in
the future. Such a court-formed doctrine could be developed as a basis
for allowing a defense seeking reduction or disallowance of an attorney's
fee. Instead of passing lightly over the acts required for fulfillment of the
attorney's fiduciary duty, the Iowa court in Nadler should have established
an explicit precedent in fiduciary misconduct by penalizing the lawyer
financially.
J. MICHAEL BROWN
Constitutional Law-First Amendment Rights-
Flag-Burning As Symbolic Expression
In a period when the first amendment's' protection of the individual
from governmental power is being challenged by new and bizarre methods
t1 - Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104.
'The first amendment binds the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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of communicating protests,2 the Supreme Court in Street v. New York'
declined to decide whether one such method-burning an American
flag-is protected as symbolic free speech. The defendant Street4 was
found guilty under a New York law making it a misdemeanor "publicly
[to] mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon or cast contempt upon
either by words or act. .." any flag of the United States.5 The majority,
through Justice Harlan, held that since he might have been convicted for
his words' and since such a conviction would be unconstitutional, the
judgment must be reversed. By refusing to reach the flag-burning issue,"
the majority failed to settle conclusively a nagging, emotional problem8
and to clarify the relationship between symbolic conduct and the first
amendment.
The dissenting opinions chastised the majority for construing the facts
to find that Street's spoken words ever were in question. Chief Justice
Warren emphasized that the defendant was not convicted for his words
because the lower courts and both parties on appeal addressed themselves
to the issue of the defendant's act of flag-burningf Justice White went
farther in stating that Street's alleged conviction for his words would not
'The recent self-immolations by high school students to protest the Vietnam
War were a form of symbolic communication.
394 U.S. 576 (1969).
'The defendant was a Negro who, having heard of the shooting of James
Meredith in Mississippi, went to a street comer and burned a forty-eight star
American flag that he formerly had displayed on national holidays.
IN.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16) (d) (McKinney 1944). This section was re-
pealed in 1967, ch. 791, § 50 [1967] N.Y. LAws 2151, and superseded by N.Y.
GEIN. Bus. LAw § 136 (McKinney 1968), which defines the offense in identical
language. Flag desecration statutes have been enacted by all states and by Con-
gress. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. IV, 1964). There is also a Uniform Flag Law
covering flag desecration. 9B UmIF Ow LAWS ANNOTATED 37-40 (1957).
'The policeman who arrested the defendant across the street from the burning
flag overheard him say to a small crowd, "We don't need no damn flag." Then
Street said to the policeman, "Yes, that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that
happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag." 394 U.S. at 578-79.7 Id. at 576, 581, 594.
' Note Chief Justice Warren's dissent:
In a time when the American flag has increasingly become an integral part
of public protests .... [B]oth those who seek constitutional shelter for acts
of flag desecration perpetrated in the course of a political protest and those
who must enforce the law are entitled to know the scope of constitutional
protection. The Court's explicit reservation of the constitutionality of flag
burning prohibitions encourages others to test in the streets the power of
our States and National Government to impose criminal sanctions upon
those who would desecrate the flag.
Id. at 604-05.
'Id. at 595 (dissenting opinion).
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matter because he was properly convicted for his acts.1" The four dis-
senters were in agreement that flag-burning can be proscribed constitu-
tionally."
Had the majority dealt with the flag-burning issue, it would have
found that Street's argument that such action is protected speech encoun-
ters serious obstacles. Before any communication can be protected, it
must be in a form that is consistent with the first amendment. Although
the Court has long defined the amendment's protection of free speech to
encompass methods of communication other than traditionally recog-
nized political oratory and distribution of pamphlets, it has made clear
that an otherwise illegal act cannot be given first-amendment protection
merely because the act was intended to express an idea. 2 And though
the Court has recognized the communicative value of tangible symbols,'8
it has emphasized that communicative tendency is not alone sufficient to
warrant first-amendment protection.' 4 Nevertheless, such activities as
the display of a red flag,15 a forced flag salute,'" a civil rights parade,
1 7
picketing by labor groups,' 8 a lunch counter sit-in, 9 and the wearing of
black armbands in opposition to the Vietnam war" have been held
methods of expression 2' protected under the first amendment.
In cases in which the Court has decided to extend the free-speech
concept to non-verbal means of expression, it has dealt with two basic
and often competing concerns-a concern in avoiding disruption and a
concern in assuring to all members and groups in society the ability to
influence the government by appealing to the public conscience. The
former touches traditional governmental police power; the latter is the
basis of the first amendment. Street's contention that the first amendment
10 Id. at 614-15 (dissenting opinion).
" Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, Justice Fortas and Justice White dis-
sented." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): "Sym-
bolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an
emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a
short cut from mind to mind." Id. at 632.
,See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
17 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
19 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"oTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
2' See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation as free speech);




should be extended to include flag-burning ultimately must be consistent
with both considerations.
Stromberg v. California,22 which held that an individual's display of
a red flag in opposition to organized government was protected as free
speech, was the first case extending the first amendment to cover symbolic
activity. The Court in that decision expressed the underlying objective
of the first amendment as "[t] he maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means .... ,
2 3
With this objective in mind the Court has greatly expanded the definition
of speech to meet the exigencies of society. From Stromberg's original
extension to include an individual's passive display of a tangible symbol,
the Court expanded the definition to accommodate labor and civil rights
protests when the mass human behavior is symbolic in itself.24 Such group
demonstrations have been called "the poor man's printing press"25 be-
cause they provide a means of expression for groups in society that are
often unable to exert pressure adequately through the normal channels of
communication.2 6 The Court's decisions to include such activities under
the first amendment's protection have certainly been motivated at least in
part by the deprivations that both labor and the Negro have struggled to
overcome. 
2
22-283 U.S. 359 (1931).
2  Id. at 369.
"'E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring): "Such a demonstration, in the circum-
stances . . .is as much a part of the free trade in ideas . . .as is verbal expres-
sion .... It, like speech, appeals to good sense and the power of reason as ap-
plied through public discussion just as much as, if not more than, a public oration
delivered from a soapbox at a street corner."
"- H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AmENDMENT 133 (1965).
" Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off
to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal
complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts
may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly. Those who do not control
television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or
circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of access
to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of ob-
struction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition are peace-
able....
"' Velvel, Freedom of Speech and the Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 KAN. L.
REv. 149, 151 (1968), advances the idea that the growing strength of labor unions
was a factor in the eventual cutback of protection given to picketing. See also
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO
AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 6 (1965): "[A]s a thumbnail summary of the last
two or three decades of speech issues in the Supreme Court, we may come to see
the Negro as winning back for us the freedoms the Communists [in cases such as
1970]
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Similar compensatory factors may be present in Street's case. His ex-
pression was aimed at racial intolerance, a cause having constitutional
as well as ethical underpinnings. Furthermore, his protest was individual
in character rather than associated with mass activity. In today's mas-
sive, bureaucratic society, the power of most individuals to communicate
is indeed small. Bizarre, symbolic behavior may be the only way for an
individual to make his beliefs heard.2" Moreover, individual conduct is
generally less likely to concern the police power, for it does not involve
the mass coercion and intimidation that group behavior often does. Since
fewer people are likely to be present, there are fewer problems with traffic
control, litter, and permits, as well as less potential for violence. 20
Even if the Court were to decide that flag burning should be in-
corporated as an avenue of expression encompassed by the first amend-
ment, protection of such a method would not be automatic. Traditional
oral methods of communication may be abridged if there are overriding
governmental interests in doing so.80 Justice Harlan's majority opinion in
Street included four possible interests of the government in the defen-
dant's oral activity:
(1) an interest in deterring appellant from vocally inciting others to
commit unlawful acts; (2) an interest in preventing appellant from
uttering words so inflammatory that they would provoke others to re-
taliate physically against him, thereby causing a breach of the peace;
(3) an interest in protecting the sensibilities of passers-by who might
be shocked by appellant's words about the American flag; and (4) an
interest in assuring that appellant, regardless of the impact of his words
upon others, showed proper respect for our national emblem.31
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)] seemed
to have lost for us."
28 It might be argued that behavior such as flag desecration would be less
bizarre and therefore would receive less publicity if there were no laws against it.
Such an assertion, however, overlooks that contemporary attitudes of the majority
are more relevant in determining whether an action is considered bizarre than
is the illegality of the conduct.
9Justice Douglas seemed to recognize such a distinction between group be-
havior and individual behavior in his concurring opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969):
Picketing can be regulated when it comes to the "plus" or "action" side of
the protest. It can be regulated as to the number of pickets and the place
and hours because traffic and other community problems would otherwise
suffer. But none of these considerations are implicated in the symbolic pro-
test to the Vietnam war in the burning of a draft card.
"o Cf. State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 341, 25 A.2d 491 (1942), in which a convic-
tion was said to be proper when based on oral criticism of the flag. The judgment
was reversed on other grounds.
81394 U.S. at 591.
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The first three interests, the Court concluded, were not applicable to the
facts in Street. 2 The fourth interest, while applicable to the facts, was the
very type of governmental interest against which the first amendment
offers protection. "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much." 8
Although the Court concluded that these interests were not sufficient
to permit state action to abridge Street's oral exhortations, it does not
necessarily follow that they are insufficient to prohibit flag-burning; the
Court has said that the first amendment does not give the same protection
to those who communicate by "conduct" as to those who communicate by
"pure speech." '34 While there may be good reasons for not giving all
forms of expression the same amount of protection,8 5 such a dichotomy
should not be over-emphasized; there can be no such thing as "pure
speech." As a scholar in the field points out: "[A]ll speech is necessarily
'speech plus.' If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt someone else;
if it is written, it may be litter."36 The only true line between what is
and what is not subject to regulation lies between beliefs and ideas, on
the one hand, and actions of any form, on the other.
37
Underlying this dichotomy between "pure speech" and "speech plus"
seems to be the assumption that "speech plus" is potentially more dis-
ruptive than "pure speech." In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District,38 the Court held that school children wearing
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War were engaging in a symbolic
act protected by the first amendment. Terming the activity "closely akin
to 'pure speech,' 9 justice Fortas emphasized the silent and passive na-
ture of these protests and the absence of any fear of a disturbance. Soon
after his Tinker decision, he concurred in upholding the suspension from
college of students who engaged in an "aggressive and violent demonstra-
"° Id. at 591-92.
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943),
quoted in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1968).
" Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
"Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (Jackson, J., concurring):
"The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound
truck and the street comer orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dan-
gers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself."
H. KALvEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 201 (1965).
"Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940): "[This] Amendment em-
braces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute,
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society."
8393 U.S. 503 (1969).
80 Id. at 505-06.
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tion, and not in a peaceful, nondisruptive expression, such as was in-
volved in Tinker."4 There have been similarly distinguishable results in
civil rights demonstration cases 41 and in picketing cases42 in which certain
activity was labeled within the scope of the first amendment while similar
but potentially more disruptive activity was not.
The New York Court of Appeals relied on the disruption factor in
sustaining Street's conviction." Terming Street's activity "incendiary,"
44
Judge Fuld quoted the Supreme Court's language in Halter v. Nebraska :
"Insults to [the] flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put
upon it . . . have often been resented and sometimes punished on the
spot."'40 Furthermore, the New York court likened flag-burning to an
abusive epithet, a category of communication that receives no first-
amendment protection because of its offensive nature and because its con-
tent is not of public importance.47
However, in United States v. O'Brien,"8 the case most similar to
Street on its facts, the Supreme Court made clear that governmental in-
terests less primary than the maintenance of order may be sufficient to
foreclose expressions such as Street's. In holding that burning of draft
cards is not within the first amendment's protection, the Court said that
even if such activity was a form of expression protected by the first amend-
ment, a "substantial" 49 state interest would warrant an incidental abridge-
ment of that expression. Although the Court in O'Brien possibly could
have relied on the disruptive potential of public draft card burning, it did
o Barker v. Hardway, 394 U.S. 905 (1969) (concurring opinion).
41 Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) with Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
" Compare Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) with Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
"People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967).
"Id. at 237, 229 N.E.2d at 191, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
"205 U.S. 34 (1907).
"Id. at 41.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1941).
"391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"Id. at 377. Such a governmental regulation is justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Id. In his concurring opinion Justice Harlan added the caveat that these interests
must not "foreclose considerations of First Amendment claims in those rare in-
stances when an 'incidental' restriction upon expression ... has the effect of en-
tirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience with whom he
could not otherwise lawfully communicate." Id. at 388-89 (concurring opinion).
[Vol. 48
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not do so. Rather, it found that the governmental interest in the admin-
istrative efficiency of the Selective Service was sufficiently compelling to
deny this avenue of communication.
By similar analysis the Court in Street would have had to make the
determination whether the government's interest in prohibiting flag-burn-
ing is "substantial." Divested of its symbolic value, the flag is merely a
piece of cloth and does not serve a substantial purpose as was found for
draft cards in O'Brien. The government's interest in preventing breaches
of the peace, which the New York Court of Appeals stated was the tradi-
tional basis for flag-desecration statutes,5 ' should not be sufficient to fore-
close completely this form of expression. Such an interest can be served
more adequately by other statutes directly aimed at preventing breaches
of the peace51 or by regulation of the time, place, and manner of such
communication.5 2 Thus the question remains whether the government's
interest in protecting its national symbols is sufficiently substantial to pro-
hibit the use of these symbols in a desecrating, but communicative, man-
ner.
5 3
By striking down statutes requiring flag salutes and pledges of al-
legiance in schools, the Court in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette5j4 seemed to negative the assertion that the government
can compel conformity and patriotism for the purpose of promoting na-
tional unity.55 National unity is a legitimate end, but it must be pro-
moted "by persuasion and example""0 rather than by means of compulsion.
ro People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 236, 229 N.E.2d 187, 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491,
495 (1967). But see Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 (1907), for the assertion
that the flag-desecration statute also "had its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feel-
ing of patriotism."
r Such statutes as breach of the peace and disorderly conduct could serve to
punish the defendant if he causes disruptive activity.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (picketing).
' There seems to be governmental acceptance of the use of such symbols in a
manner that supports the government, e.g., the widespread use of flag decals on
automobile windshields.
1319 U.S. 624 (1943).
" Barnette expressly overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940). Note justice Frankfurter's statement in Gobitis concerning the public
policy behind compulsory flag-saluting:
[T]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind
and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people. ...
The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal dif-
ferences.
310 U.S. at 596. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), in which the Court
speaks of the "object of maintaining the flag as an emblem of National Power and
National honor." Id. at 42.
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
1970]
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Although the prohibition of the desecration of national symbols is not the
same as compelling acts of allegiance, such a prohibition may be going be-
yond the limits of persuasion and example.
Despite Barnette, however, the dissenters in Street seem to have as-
serted that there is a legitimate and substantial governmental interest in
promoting patriotism by means of national symbols. In saying that
desecration of the flag can be proscribed, Chief Justice Warren spoke of
the "power to protect the flag from acts of desecration and disgrace" 7
rather than a power to avoid the disruption attendant an act of abusing
the flag. Justice Fortas, moreover, termed the flag "a special kind of per-
sonalty ...burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions."5 8
From the emphatic nature of the dissenting opinions, from lower court
decisions sustaining flag-desecration statutes and from the lack of any
strong precedent upholding such activity, the majority's refusal to meet
the issue of flag-burning should be taken as a rejection of Street's con-
tention that such an avenue of expression is protected by the first amend-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court should realize that there are many factors
in favor of expanding the first amendment's protection to include peaceful
symbolic communication of any kind. Moreover, the recognition of an
interest in promoting patriotic values should be a very limited one, for
such an interest could lead to the kind of enforced conformity that is ab-
horrent to a system of government founded upon individual rights.
WILIAm M. TROTT
Corporations-Voting Trusts-Should Trust Principles Apply
to Close Corporations?
Ever since the corporate form of doing business became prevalent
around the turn of the century, the attorney for the close corporation has
been troubled by many difficult problems; and in trying to solve them, he
has been "hampered by doctrines which are meaningful only in the con-
text of the large, publicly held company."' One of these problems is that
of providing some method for ensuring continuity and stability of man-
agement when no one stockholder, or faction of stockholders, owns a ma-
jority of voting stock. Another is that of providing means for resolving
5 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1968).
58 Id. at 616-17.
'Note, Close Corporations: Voting Trust Legislation and Resolution of Dead-
locks, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 590 (1967).
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